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Justice for Girls: Are We Making Progress?
Francine T. Sherman
ABSTRACT
Over the course of more than a century, structural gender bias has been a remarkably 
durable feature of U.S. juvenile justice systems.  Consequently, as these systems have 
developed over the years, reducing gender bias and addressing girls in helpful, rather than 
harmful, ways has required speci!c and concerted e"orts on the part of federal and state 
governments.  Currently, there are a number of positive trends in juvenile justice, including 
policy and practice that is increasingly developmentally centered and data driven.  #e question 
for those focused on girls in the juvenile justice system is how to ensure that girls are the 
bene!ciaries of these positive trends. 
#is Article discusses the history of federal leadership on girls’ issues and then considers 
the impact on girls of current trends toward developmentally centered and data-driven 
juvenile justice.  It considers the application of developmentally centered policy in relation to 
girls who experience family violence and those who are commercially sexually exploited. 
#e Article then examines the movement toward data-driven decisionmaking for its 
potential to reduce embedded gender bias and particularly bias at the intersection of race and 
gender.  It examines the impact on girls of the increasing use of assessment instruments 
and the consequences of greater reliance on evidence-based practice as further illustrations 
of the new data-driven approaches.  #roughout, the Article discusses the implications of 
these trends for girls and suggests ways that systems can ensure that girls’ issues are 
considered and addressed.
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INTRODUCTION 
Social expectations that girls behave obediently, modestly, and cautiously have 
been remarkably durable over more than one hundred years of juvenile justice in the 
United States, and throughout that time these expectations have masked structural 
gender discrimination.  At the turn of the twentieth century, these expectations 
were behind the proliferation of training schools for immigrant girls who were 
perceived to be immoral and in need of guidance that would enable them to marry 
and to become responsible mothers.1  In the mid– and late twentieth century, these 
expectations supported detention and incarceration of girls for status offenses, for 
technical probation violations, and particularly for running away.2  Now, these same 
expectations result in the detention and incarceration of girls who fight back at 
home or in intimate relationships and who are victims of sexual exploitation.3 
The structural discrimination that supports detaining and incarcerating girls 
for violating these norms is both hard to see and hard to challenge.4  It is often 
hidden behind outward goodwill toward girls and legitimate expressions of concern 
for their vulnerability and possible victimization.  This concern is consistent with 
the social welfare mission of the juvenile court and the many opportunities for 
multifactored, “best interests”–based discretionary decisions built into the juvenile 
justice and child welfare systems.5  However, a closer look suggests that what 
professes to be social welfare is often social control of teenage girls who frustrate 
child welfare and juvenile justice systems with their chronic disobedience of home, 
court, and agency rules.6  Studies show that girls are more likely than boys to be 
held in contempt for violating court-imposed rules7 and that probation officers 
  
1. See infra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 119–171 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 174–188 and accompanying text. 
5. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the 
Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 848–49 (1988); Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-
Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 
307–08 (2008); see also 43 C.J.S. Infants § 82 (2012). 
6. See Patricia J. Arthur & Regina Waugh, Status Offenses and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act: The Exception That Swallowed the Rule, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 555, 558 
(2009); Meda Chesney-Lind, Reaction Essay, Criminalizing Victimization: The Unintended Consequences 
of Pro-arrest Policies for Girls and Women, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 81, 84 (2002). 
7. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Gender Bias in Juvenile Justice Processing: Implications of 
the JJDP Act, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1162, 1180 & n.40 (1992). 
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view girls as needy and difficult.8  Illustrating this attitude, probation officers in the 
first all-female probation unit had to be enticed to work girls’ cases by offers to 
trade ten boys’ cases for one girl’s case.9  And when girls in the justice system are not 
seen as needy, they are seen as increasingly aggressive—acting more like bad boys.10 
In the 1992 amendments11 to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(JJDP) Act,12 the U.S. Congress instructed states to analyze their systems’ provision 
of “gender-specific services” to female offenders and plan the delivery of gender-
specific treatment and prevention services.13  At that time, just over 300,000 girls 
were referred to juvenile courts on delinquency charges, making girls 20 percent of 
the total delinquency court population.  By 2008, the number of girls referred to 
juvenile court had increased by 48 percent to 450,000—almost 30 percent of total 
delinquency court referrals.14 
Unlike the restriction on disproportionate minority contact (DMC), which 
addresses racial disparities at all stages of the juvenile justice process, the provision 
of gender-responsive services has never been a core requirement of the JJDP Act 
upon which federal funding is contingent15 and has never been fully described.  
Partially for these reasons, analysis of gender’s role in juvenile justice systems and 
  
8. See Emily Gaarder, Nancy Rodriguez & Marjorie S. Zatz, Criers, Liars, and Manipulators: Probation 
Officers’ Views of Girls, 21 JUST. Q. 547, 556–58 (2004). 
9. Marian D. Daniel, The Female Intervention Team, JUV. JUST., Oct. 1999, at 14, 14, available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/jjjournal1099/fem1.html. 
10. See, e.g., DEBORAH PROTHROW-STITH & HOWARD R. SPIVAK, SUGAR AND SPICE AND NO 
LONGER NICE: HOW WE CAN STOP GIRLS’ VIOLENCE 4 (2005) (“Girls are fighting like boys—
not as much (yet) but with similar willingness to use physical violence.”). 
11. Act of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, 106 Stat. 4982.  
12. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601–5784 (2006). 
13. See id. § 5633(a)(7)(B).  See generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr., What About the Girls? The Role of the Federal 
Government in Addressing the Rise in Female Juvenile Offenders, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 29 (2003). 
14. See FRANCINE T. SHERMAN, RICHARD A. MENDEL & ANGELA IRVINE, MAKING DETENTION 
REFORM WORK FOR GIRLS: JDAI PRACTICE GUIDE #5 (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3–4) 
(citing M. Sickmund et al., Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2009, OFF. JUV. JUST. & 
DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs/asp/selection.asp (last visited July 9, 
2012)).  From 1992 to 2002, while girls’ referrals were steadily rising, the number of boys referred to 
juvenile courts remained fairly constant.  Sickmund et al., supra.  Between 2002 and 2008, the number 
of boys referred to juvenile courts declined 8 percent while the number of girls referred increased slightly.  
Id.  Girls’ arrests show a similar pattern.  In 1992, girls made up 23 percent of all juvenile arrests, see 
Howard N. Snyder, Fact Sheet: 1992 Juvenile Arrests—FBI Uniform Crime Reports Data, NAT’L CRIM. 
JUST. REFERENCE CENTER (May 1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/fs-9413.txt, and by 2002, this 
number had risen to 29 percent.  See HOWARD N. SNYDER, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2002, at 8 (2004), available at https://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204608.pdf.  It continued to rise, and girls made up close to 30 percent of 
juvenile arrests in 2008.  Sickmund et al., supra. 
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(7)(B) (stating that there only need be a “plan” for the provision of gender-
specific services).  
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federal leadership on the issue of gender have been inconsistent.16  Meanwhile, gender 
inequities in juvenile justice systems persist—girls are rarely a high priority for state 
and local juvenile justice systems, which more commonly wait to address girls’ issues 
until they have addressed issues facing other populations or until public pressure 
requires them to focus on girls.  And while jurisdictions must analyze race dispar-
ities, few make the intersection of race and gender a part of that analysis.17  
Because of a lack of full and practical understanding of the mechanisms that perpet-
uate gender inequity in juvenile justice and because of the durability of gender 
bias in our social structure, many of the current inequities in juvenile justice systems 
result from the unconscious and unnecessary repetition of past mistakes. 
Notwithstanding this critical view of the juvenile justice system’s treatment 
of girls, recently there have been signs that the direction of juvenile justice in the 
United States may be changing for the better.  Overall the number of youth, includ-
ing girls, entering the juvenile justice system is declining,18 and many observers 
agree that we may be entering an era of more developmentally centered and 
data-driven juvenile justice policies19 that rely less on incarcerating youth and more 
on building community and family support for youth to thrive.20  Positive juvenile 
justice developments cited by commentators are wide ranging and include identi-
fication of violence prevention programs that work; research on the brain development 
of teenagers and the developmental differences between youth and adults; research 
on competence and culpability that has changed thinking about adolescent judg-
ment and decisionmaking; an increased focus on issues raised by girls in the justice 
system; evolving standards for humane conditions in juvenile facilities and an 
awareness of poor conditions;21 reduced secure incarceration of youth; and reduced 
racial and ethnic disparities through the use of focused data analysis.22   
  
16. See infra notes 32–53 and accompanying text. 
17. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (discussing the intersection of race and gender 
discrimination in criminal justice policies); Jody Miller, An Examination of Disposition Decision-
Making for Delinquent Girls, in RACE, GENDER, AND CLASS IN CRIMINOLOGY: THE INTERSECTIONS 
219 (Martin D. Schwartz & Dragan Milovanovic eds., 1999); Jyoti Nanda, Blind Discretion: Girls 
of Color & Delinquency in the Juvenile Justice System, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1502 (2012); Kim Taylor-
Thompson, Girl Talk—Examining Racial and Gender Lines in Juvenile Justice, 6 NEV. L.J. 1137 (2006). 
18. See Sickmund et al., supra note 14. 
19. See, e.g., Mark Soler, Dana Shoenberg & Marc Schindler, Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483, 537 (2009) (arguing that “policy makers now have abundant 
evidence of effective approaches” for developmentally appropriate programs and services). 
20. See, e.g., id. at 488–92. 
21. For details on the legal theories and requirements regarding conditions of confinement for institu-
tionalized youth, see MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ch. 2 (2012). 
22. See Soler, Shoenberg & Schindler, supra note 19, at 488–92. 
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While the current promise of a smarter, more equitable, and more effective 
juvenile justice system is exciting, given girls’ status as a long-overlooked minority 
population in juvenile justice systems and the historical gender bias embedded 
in these systems, it is fair to wonder whether girls will be full beneficiaries of these 
promising developments.  At the same time, given the increased awareness that 
girls present specific juvenile justice concerns and considering the twenty-year-old 
federal directive to jurisdictions to assess gender responsiveness, one could reasona-
bly insist that they will be. 
This Article aims to help juvenile justice systems and advocates for girls ensure 
that, as the juvenile justice landscape changes, we do not default to well-known 
patterns of unconscious discrimination.  This requires that policymakers and system 
administrators and staff intentionally and critically examine their practices for gender 
impact and understand the ways in which their decisions reinforce structural 
gender bias.  It also requires a fuller understanding of how gender and race discrim-
ination intersect in youth policy to drive teenage girls of color into the justice system.23  
Part I examines the history of girls in the juvenile justice system and assesses federal 
attempts to move toward more equitable practices and effective programs for girls.  
Part II looks at the increased role of child development in juvenile justice, and 
specifically at the impact of trauma on girls’ behaviors and the effect of standard juve-
nile justice practices on girls.  Finally, Part III examines several aspects of the 
movement toward data-driven decisionmaking in juvenile justice, including data’s 
potential to reduce embedded gender bias, particularly at the intersection of race and 
gender, the impact of the increasing use of assessment instruments on girls, and the 
consequences of greater reliance on evidence-based practice.  Throughout the Article, 
I discuss implications of these trends for girls and suggest ways in which systems 
can ensure that girls’ issues are considered and addressed.  
I. A HISTORY OF GIRLS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 
The use of the juvenile justice system to protect wayward girls began with the 
first articulation of the principle of parens patriae by a U.S. court in Ex parte 
Crouse.24  Mary Ann Crouse was committed by a justice of the peace to the House 
of Refuge for being an “incorrigible or vicious” “female[] under the age of eighteen 
years.”25  Her father sued for her release, arguing that without a jury her detention 
was punitive and unconstitutional.  The court held that her detention was not punitive 
  
23. See supra note 17. 
24. 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839). 
25. Id. at 10. 
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but was justified under the state’s parens patriae power: “May not the natural parents 
when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of it be superceded by parens 
patriae, or common guardian of the community?”26  The state used its parens patriae 
authority, presented as the state’s power to stand in for an unfit parent, to control 
the behavior of a difficult girl by placing her in secure detention. 
This was typical of girls’ treatment in the early years of juvenile justice in the 
United States, and much of juvenile justice decisionmaking today is consistent 
with this history.  Accounts of girls’ treatment in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
show that the juvenile justice system frequently intervened to save wayward girls 
from perceived futures in prostitution or criminality27 and redirect them toward 
marriage, motherhood, and home life.  Girls in need of intervention were seen as 
both sexually vulnerable and sexually precocious; the system’s role was to instill in 
them appropriate morality.28 
Juvenile court jurisdiction was quickly broadened beyond the violation of crim-
inal laws to include status offenses, such as incorrigibility, running away, truancy, 
and, in some states, waywardness (or immorality).29  Reflecting the notion that 
girls were more vulnerable and in need of protection than boys (or perhaps that girls 
were more innocent in character and less blameworthy), some of the early status 
offender laws granted longer jurisdiction over girls than over boys.  For example, 
New York’s Persons in Need of Services (PINS) law provided jurisdiction over 
girls until age eighteen and over boys until age sixteen.30  Although state courts 
struck down much of this gender inequality in the language of status offense laws in 
  
26. Id. 
27. See BARBARA M. BRENZEL, DAUGHTERS OF THE STATE: A SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE 
FIRST REFORM SCHOOL FOR GIRLS IN NORTH AMERICA, 1856–1905, at 38–41 (1983); ANNE 
MEIS KNUPFER, REFORM AND RESISTANCE: GENDER, DELINQUENCY, AND AMERICA’S FIRST 
JUVENILE COURT 79–98 (2001); Lisa Pasko, Damaged Daughters: The History of Girls’ Sexuality and 
the Juvenile Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1099, 1101–05 (2010). 
28. See Pasko, supra note 27, at 1101.  The focus and double standard with respect to girls’ sexuality is still 
present in juvenile justice.  One example is the inconsistent treatment of girls who have been commercially 
sexually exploited.  See infra Part II.C. 
29. See BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 132–34 
(3d ed. 2009).  Modern status offenses include underage drinking, curfew laws, and others that define 
crimes only for minors.  These laws stand alone and are typically not components of comprehensive 
status offender schemes such as the New York Persons in Need of Services (PINS) law, 1962 N.Y. 
Laws 3106–07 (codified as amended at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 711–718 (McKinney 2010), and the 
Massachusetts Child in Need of Services (CHINS) law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39E–J 
(LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2012).  
30. 1962 N.Y. Laws 3106–07. 
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the 1970s,31 today we continue to see gender bias in the enforcement of status 
offense laws. 
The federal Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender (DSO) mandate 
included in the JJDP Act of 197432 targets the problem of the incarceration of girls 
in the name of protection.  The DSO mandate prohibits states from confining 
status offenders in locked facilities such as those used for delinquent youth.33  The 
hearings that led up to the Act’s passage reflected the concern that states had crimi-
nalized “social and adjustment problems” by confining these youth, many of them 
girls, alongside juveniles who had committed serious crimes.34  But states struggled 
to comply with the DSO mandate.  A 1977 General Accounting Office (GAO) 
report documented states’ general failure to remove status offenders from secure 
facilities, noting that “[t]he situation is worse for girls than for boys.”35  At that time, 
70 percent of all girls in juvenile detention and correctional facilities were status 
offenders as compared to 20 percent of boys.36  The GAO reported that states’ 
failures to comply were the result of (1) state laws and practices that conflicted with 
the DSO mandate; (2) inadequate alternative services to deal with status offenders 
outside of detention; and (3) inadequate monitoring systems to determine compli-
ance, including inadequate data collection by states.37 
In 1980, Congress responded to state pressure and passed an exception to the 
DSO mandate, which allowed secure confinement of status offenders for violating 
a valid court order (VCO).38  This exception is still in effect but has been the 
subject of ongoing discussion.  States continued to detain status-offending girls by 
bootstrapping delinquency onto status offenses.  This occurs either by finding girls 
in violation of probation conditions imposed for their status offenses or by charging 
a status offender with a minor crime in order to relabel her conduct as delinquent.  
Senate Bill 678, which passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2009 but has 
  
31. See, e.g., Patricia A. v. City of New York, 286 N.E.2d 432, 435 (N.Y. 1972).  Though it was found 
unconstitutional in 1972, the law was not officially amended until 2000.  2000 N.Y. Laws 3418. 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (2006). 
33. Id. 
34. 120 CONG. REC. 25,156 (1974). 
35. Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Delinquency of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 2 (1977) (statement of William J. Anderson, Deputy Dir., Gen. 
Gov’t Div.). 
36. Id. 
37. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., GGD-78-37, REMOVING STATUS OFFENDERS FROM 
SECURE FACILITIES: FEDERAL LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE ARE NEEDED (1978). 
38. JJDP Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11)(A)(ii); Robert (Bobby) Scott, Afterword of JUVENILE JUSTICE: 
ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 527, 528 (Francine T. Sherman & Francine 
H. Jacobs eds., 2011). 
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not become law, would have repealed the VCO exception.39  Supporters of repeal 
argued that the ability to detain status offenders allows states to avoid developing 
interventions to assist chaotic families and youth who are struggling in their homes 
and schools.40 
In the early 1990s, federal emphasis shifted from attempting to address bias 
against girls in the juvenile justice and status offender systems, to encouraging 
programming designed and delivered to meet girls’ needs.41  The 1992 reauthor-
ization of the JJDP Act required states to analyze their juvenile justice systems’ 
provision of “gender-specific services” to female offenders and plan the delivery 
of gender-specific treatment and prevention services.42  This focus on gender-specific 
programming (later renamed “gender-responsive” programming) was supported 
by the availability of Challenge E funds, to aid jurisdictions in providing these 
programs to girls in their delinquency systems.43  The widespread use of Challenge 
E funds by states demonstrated significant local interest in as well as concern over 
girls not being well served by existing juvenile justice programming.44 
Federal efforts have continued to encourage states to provide effective gender-
responsive programming for girls.  However, the Girls Study Group, established 
by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in 2004 
and the National Girls Initiative, established in 2010, have also returned the focus to 
ways in which the juvenile justice process is biased against or harmful to girls.  
In 2009, the Girls Study Group disseminated important descriptive data about girls 
in the system and addressed the troubling mistaken impression that girls were 
becoming more violent.45  That analysis found that rather than signifying an overall 
increase in girls’ aggression, the increase in arrests of girls for assaults was in large 
  
39. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2009, S. 678, 111th Cong. (2009). 
40. Meeting the Challenges Faced by Girls in the Juvenile Justice System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Healthy Families and Communities of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 111th Cong. 24–25 (2010) 
(statement of Judge Brian Huff).  See generally Arthur & Waugh, supra note 6, at 558. 
41. See Act of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, 106 Stat. 4982 (amending the JJDP Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 5601–5784 (2006)).  The JJDP Act reauthorization of 1992 requires the GAO to study gender 
bias in state justice systems’ handling of status offenders.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD-95-56, JUVENILE JUSTICE: MINIMAL GENDER BIAS OCCURRED IN PROCESSING 
NONCRIMINAL JUVENILES 1 (1995). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(7)(B). 
43. See Biden, supra note 13, at 41–42; Meda Chesney-Lind & Katherine Irwin, Still the “Best Place to 
Conquer Girls”: Girls and the Juvenile Justice System, in WOMEN, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 271, 
286–88 (Alida V. Merlo & Joycelyn M. Pollock eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
44. Chesney-Lind & Irwin, supra note 43, at 286–88. 
45. See THE DELINQUENT GIRL (Margaret A. Zahn ed., 2009) (compiling research performed by 
members of the Girls Study Group); MARGARET A. ZAHN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
& DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, VIOLENCE BY TEENAGE GIRLS: TRENDS AND CONTEXT (2008).  
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part the result of changed laws and law enforcement practices around domestic vio-
lence.  These changes had a particular impact on girls because much of their assaul-
tive behavior occurs in the home and among family members, such as fighting 
between girls and their mothers or among siblings.46  A decade ago, these cases 
would have resulted in referrals to family services, but today these girls are arrested, 
charged with assault, and often detained.47  Charging girls for behavior arising from 
family chaos sweeps girls with trauma histories and chaotic families into secure juve-
nile justice confinement.48  However, unlike with a traditional status offense, these girls 
potentially face the collateral consequences that accompany delinquency findings.49 
The Girls Study Group also continued federal efforts to promote gender-
responsive programming.  One of the ongoing problems in the field, however, has 
been confusion about what gender-responsive programming means in practice.  
“Painting it Pink is Not Enough” is a catch phrase for those promoting gender-
responsive approaches but provides little in terms of content for juvenile justice and 
community programs to follow.  Gender-responsive approaches consider the particular 
situations, developmental characteristics, and life circumstances of girls in the justice 
system, including their experiences as females in the justice system itself.  Gender-
responsive approaches also consider the trauma backgrounds common among girls 
in the justice system and the ways in which social expectations for girls and the 
resulting roles girls play in their families and communities affect their development 
and behavior.50  Although there are a number of formulations of gender-responsive 
  
46. See infra Part II.B. 
47. ZAHN ET AL., supra note 45, at 6–7. 
48. See SHERMAN, MENDEL & IRVINE, supra note 14 (reviewing detention system data and describing 
an approach to data analysis to help systems understand why girls are detained and how to reduce their 
detention); see also Jamie Edwards, A Lesson in Unintended Consequences: How Juvenile Justice and 
Domestic Violence Reforms Harm Girls in Violent Family Situations (And How to Help Them), 13 U. PA. 
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 219 (2009). 
49. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(f) (West 2011) (stating that a juvenile adjudication for a 
felony offense that results in commitment to the Texas Youth Commission is deemed a “final felony 
conviction” for purposes of future enhanced sentencing); In re Justin V., 797 N.W.2d 755, 765–66 
(Neb. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine 
was applicable because the juvenile would be subject to various collateral consequences as result of 
his juvenile record); 32 C.F.R. § 96.6 (2011) (authorizing the military to consider an applicant’s juvenile 
record); Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public 
Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 570, 577–79 (2004) (finding that some 
housing authorities investigate the criminal histories of juveniles to determine housing eligibility of 
their families); Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the 
Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111, 1114–15 (2006). 
50. See Francine T. Sherman & Jessica H. Greenstone, The Role of Gender In Youth Systems: Grace’s Story, 
in JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 131, 137–39; see also What Does Gender-Specific Programming 
Look Like in Practice?, in OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PROMISING FEMALE PROGRAMMING: AN INVENTORY OF BEST 
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elements, there is consensus across the literature that to be gender responsive, a 
program or system should (1) provide a safe space, both physically and psycholog-
ically; (2) promote relationships; and (3) share power with girls and across the 
multiple systems that work with girls.51 
The study group also worked to improve the science around risk and needs 
assessment and program evaluation for girls.  Critics argued that efforts by the Girls 
Study Group to promote evidence-based practices in girls programs raised the bar 
too high for those programs that were unable to mount the evaluations necessary to 
classify as an evidence-based practice, and that the study group missed local inno-
vation and success among smaller, community-based organizations.52  The implicit 
critique was that, as a result, OJJDP, through the Girls Study Group, was not provid-
ing essential, practical evaluation support to the field.  Beginning in 2010, the 
National Girls Initiative, as the successor to the Girls Study Group, is making an 
effort to respond to the needs of the field by blending science with knowledge devel-
oped in practice as they implement their agenda.53 
The desire to control girls’ misbehavior that animated the early history of girls 
in the juvenile justice system remains today.  Through strict enforcement of tech-
nical probation and parole violations (violations of the conditions of probation and 
parole, rather than new crimes), liberal use of warrants, and increased charging of 
misdemeanor and home-based offenses,54 girls with significant experiences of trauma 
who pose little threat to public safety continue to populate secure detention and 
postadjudication facilities.  Meanwhile, states continue to struggle as female status 
offenders escalate through a system that is not designed to encourage their devel-
opment into productive adulthood.  Girls charged with assaults and domestic battery 
arising from family violence are, in effect, the new status offender, whose chaotic 
  
PRACTICES (1998), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/principles/ch2_6.html; Barbara E. 
Bloom & Stephanie S. Covington, Gender-Specific Programming for Female Offenders: What 
Is It and Why Is It Important? (Nov. 1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stephanie 
covington.com/pdfs/13.pdf; Barbara E. Bloom & Stephanie S. Covington, Effective Gender-
Responsive Interventions in Juvenile Justice: Addressing the Lives of Delinquent Girls (Nov. 2001) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://centerforgenderandjustice.org/pdf/7.pdf.  
51. Sherman & Greenstone, supra note 50, at 137–39. 
52. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-721R, JUVENILE JUSTICE: TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE AND BETTER DEFINED EVALUATION PLANS WILL HELP TO IMPROVE GIRLS’ 
DELINQUENCY PROGRAMS (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/96317.pdf; see also 
infra notes 241–245 and accompanying text. 
53. Telephone Interview With Lawanda Revoira, Director, NCCD Ctr. on Women and Girls (Feb. 
7, 2012). 
54. See infra notes 108–114 and accompanying text. 
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family situations and human services needs form the backdrop for entry into the 
juvenile justice system. 
There has been significantly heightened awareness since 1992 that girls are 
a subpopulation within juvenile justice requiring specific research, policies, and 
programs.  However, federal leadership has been inconsistent and issue-specific; it has 
focused, for example, on status offenders or commercial sexual exploitation, allowing 
the larger systemic and societal issues to remain despite a significant increase in 
research and understanding of girls’ needs and the sorts of interventions that are 
likely to be successful. 
II. CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY 
Throughout much of its history, juvenile justice has been remarkably discon-
nected from the theory and research on child development.  But in 2005, the U.S. 
Supreme Court shifted the direction of juvenile justice by making a critical link 
between jurisprudence and developmental research.  In Roper v. Simmons,55 which 
concerned the application of the death penalty to defendants under the age of 
eighteen, the Court found that juveniles are developmentally different from adults 
in significant ways and that these developmental differences, “as any parent knows 
and as the scientific and sociological studies . . . confirm,” prevent juveniles from 
being classified as the most culpable criminals.56  Reasoning that juveniles (1) lack 
maturity and have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; (2) are more vulnera-
ble to outside pressure; and (3) have characters and personalities that are not fully 
formed,57 the Court found that juveniles could never be as culpable as adults.  Based 
in part on these developmental findings, the Supreme Court held the death penalty 
unconstitutional for any individual under the age of eighteen.58 
In 2010, the Supreme Court reiterated Roper’s developmental findings in 
Graham v. Florida,59 saying that in the intervening years the developmental research 
had only been strengthened.60  The Court went on to say that in addition to these 
developmental differences, there was evidence that juveniles’ brains develop  
 
 
  
55. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
56. Id. at 569. 
57. Id. at 569–70. 
58. Id. at 570–71, 578–79. 
59. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
60. Id. at 2026. 
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throughout adolescence, which influences their decisionmaking.61  The Court then 
extended what (until then) had been analysis applied only to death penalty jurispru-
dence62 to find sentences of life without the possibility of parole unconstitutional 
when imposed on juveniles for nonhomicide offenses.63  Rather than taking a narrow 
approach, the Court held that the combination of a nonhomicide offense, a sentence 
of life without the possibility of parole, and minority status categorically violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.64  
In the years following Graham, lower courts explored the reach of its holding, 
considering whether juvenile life without parole is constitutional under federal 
and state constitutions for felony murder,65 accomplice cases,66 and homicide cases 
for young juveniles.67  Most recently, in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs,68 
the Supreme Court further extended Roper and Graham.  In Miller and Jackson the 
Court held unconstitutional mandatory sentences of life without parole in juvenile 
homicide cases.69  While the Court did not find sentences of life without parole cate-
gorically unconstitutional for juveniles, it held that a life without parole sentence 
can only be imposed after the sentencer takes into account “how children are different, 
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime 
in prison.”70 
Developmental notions are making their way into areas other than juvenile 
sentencing as well.  In state and federal courts, there is an increasing focus on 
  
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 2022–23, 2030. 
63. Id. at 2034. 
64. Id. at 2030–34; see also Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How 
the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 8–10 (2011). 
65. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 636 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2011); Jones v. McQuiggin, No. 
2:11-cv-188, 2011 WL 2745827 (W.D. Mich. July 12, 2011); People v. Perez, No. G042811, 2011 
WL 521319 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2011); People v. Chappell, No. B214616, 2011 WL 105652 
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2011); People v. Hernandez, No. B218507, 2010 WL 2598265 (Cal. Ct. 
App. June 30, 2010); State v. Uzzelle, No. COA10-600, 2011 WL 705152 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 
1, 2011). 
66. See, e.g., Delatorre v. Haws, No. 2:09-cv-1974-TJB, 2011 WL 2471027 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2011); 
Cox v. State, No. CR 00-345, 2011 WL 737307 (Ark. Mar. 3, 2011); Hernandez, 2010 WL 
2598265; People v. Donald, No. A121820, 2010 WL 2594940 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2010). 
67. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that a sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole was unconstitutional when imposed on a fourteen-year-old boy convicted 
of murder). 
68. Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646 (U.S. June 25, 2012).  The Miller v. Alabama opinion decides both 
that case and Jackson v. Hobbs.  Id., slip op. at 1 n.*. 
69. Id., slip op. at 27. 
70. Id., slip op. at 17. 
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juvenile competency to stand trial,71 waive counsel,72 and confess when 
interrogated.73  In 2011, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,74 the Supreme Court took the 
developmental findings articulated in Roper and Graham as a given and held that 
age, as long as it is known or should be known to police, must be considered as an 
objective factor in determining whether a juvenile is in custody and therefore 
whether the police are required to provide Miranda warnings.75  In reiterating 
Roper’s and Graham’s developmental findings the Court noted that history is 
“‘replete with laws and judicial recognition’ that children cannot be viewed simply 
as miniature adults.”76 
In the last twenty years, juvenile justice systems have also incorporated consid-
eration of child development more frankly into their policies and practices.77  
Juvenile justice systems are using principles of restorative justice78 and more recently, 
positive youth development79 to frame probation services, dispositions, and the 
structure of juvenile commitment after adjudication.  Innovations like TeamChild, 
a Seattle-based nonprofit organization,80 recognize that youth in the justice system, 
like all youth, are more likely to succeed when they are well educated and so provide 
representation to delinquency-involved youth on matters related to education, 
healthcare, and housing in partnership with their delinquency defense.81  Similarly, 
  
71. See, e.g., Tyrone B. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569, 570–71 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. M.C., 
60 So. 3d 1264, 1265 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that a juvenile was not competent to stand trial 
after ordering a competency hearing); In re T.S., 798 N.W.2d 649, 654–55 (N.D. 2011). 
72. See, e.g., A.S. v. State, 62 So. 3d 695, 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the trial court com-
mitted “fundamental error” when it failed to inquire thoroughly as to whether the juvenile understood 
and had the capacity to intelligently choose to waive counsel and to obtain the required verified 
written waiver); L.D.S.J. v. State, 14 So. 3d 289, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that “the 
trial court had an obligation to ensure [that a juvenile defendant] intelligently and voluntarily waived 
his right to counsel”); In re C.S., 874 N.E.2d 1177, 1194 (Ohio 2007).  
73. See, e.g., In re A.S., 999 A.2d 1136, 1138 (N.J. 2010). 
74. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
75. Id. at 2408.  J.D.B. was thirteen years old.  Id. at 2399. 
76. Id. at 2404 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)). 
77. Cf. JEFFREY BUTTS, SUSAN MAYER & GRETCHEN RUTH, CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN, 
ISSUE BRIEF #105: FOCUSING JUVENILE JUSTICE ON POSITIVE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT 4 
(2005); Richard M. Lerner et al., A Vision for the American Juvenile Justice System: The Positive Youth 
Development Perspective, in JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 92. 
78. See Marlyce Nuzum, Summaries of State Restorative Justice Legislation, STOPVIOLENCE, 
http://www.stopviolence.com/restorative/rjleg-detail.htm (last visited July 9, 2012).  
79. See supra note 77. 
80. See TEAMCHILD, http://teamchild.org (last visited July 9, 2012). 
81. TeamChild focuses on changing the way the juvenile system operates by addressing the often-
unaddressed underlying causes of juvenile delinquency.  The organization provides civil legal aid, such 
as education advocacy, to youth involved in the juvenile justice system.  It serves youth ages twelve to 
eighteen who are experiencing school failure and exclusion, conflict in the home, mental illness, 
substance abuse, delinquency, and homelessness by advocating for children’s rights to basic services 
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in Massachusetts, the statewide Youth Advocacy Department has developed a 
nationally recognized model of juvenile defense based on principles of positive 
youth development.82 
Recently, this developmental approach has found support in federally funded 
programs that are increasingly collaborative and have youth development at their 
core.83  The federal Defending Childhood initiative is one example.  In 2010, the 
federal government provided grants to eight demonstration projects to develop 
community-based programming through broad local collaborations to address the 
impact on children of exposure to violence.  Using a public health model with a 
focus on prevention, Defending Childhood collaborations cross a number of sectors 
including health, education, justice, and law enforcement.84  Collaborative programs 
such as this, that are funded across federal agencies, acknowledge in their organi-
zation and service delivery that youth are growing and flexible, that they both 
influence and are influenced by their environments, and that family, community, 
and society shape their growth and provide opportunities to promote their posi-
tive development.  
A. What Does This Developmental Focus Mean for Girls? 
As of 2008, only 2.6 percent of those sentenced to life without parole as juve-
niles were female,85 so few are direct beneficiaries of the rulings in Graham, Miller, 
and Jackson.  Indeed, the majority of girls in the juvenile system are there for status 
and misdemeanor offenses and violations of probation.86  However, the Supreme 
  
so that they can create a foundation for long-term stability.  See About Us, TEAMCHILD, http://teamchild.org/ 
index.php/about (last visited July 9, 2012); TeamChild Description, SEATTLE FOUND. (Dec. 10, 
2010), http://www.seattlefoundation.org/npos/Pages/TeamChild.aspx. 
82. See PATRICIA PURITZ & WENDY WAN LONG SHANG, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NCJ 171151, INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO JUVENILE INDIGENT 
DEFENSE 4 (1998), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171151.pdf.  The Massachusetts 
Youth Advocacy Department was formerly called Youth Advocacy Project (YAP). 
83. See, e.g., DEFENDING CHILDHOOD, http://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood (last visited July 9, 
2012); NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, http://www.nctsn.org (last visited July 
9, 2012). 
84. About the Initiative, DEFENDING CHILDHOOD, http://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/about-
initiative.html (last visited July 9, 2012). 
85. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR 
YOUTH OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2008, at 2 (2008). 
86. In 2008, 64 percent of girls’ arrests were for six nonviolent offense categories: running away, loitering 
or violating curfew, liquor law violations, disorderly conduct, and a catch-all category consisting of 
all non-indexed non-traffic offenses, which were primarily low-level misdemeanors.  Girls accounted 
for 31 percent of arrests for curfew violations and loitering, 33 percent of disorderly conduct arrests, 
44 percent of arrests for larceny and theft; 56 percent of arrests for running away and 76 percent of 
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Court’s developmental findings and the movement to incorporate child development 
into juvenile justice policies and practices have particular application to girls in the 
justice system.  Both the behaviors that result in girls’ arrests and the structural 
mechanisms that pull them into the justice system for those behaviors relate to 
child development.  Girls’ behaviors must be understood ecologically, as reactions 
to and in tension with the concentric circles of family, community, and society in girls’ 
lives, and it is that ecological framing that provides more nuanced and devel-
opmentally informed responses. 
Running away is one example of a relatively common behavior among 
system-involved girls.  Girls often exhibit this behavior in response to their envi-
ronments, but it drives many girls into juvenile systems nonetheless.87  Both boys 
and girls run away from home, but studies show that 75 percent of runaways are 
female, and for girls, running away is disproportionately a trigger for system 
involvement.88  In 2009, girls made up 55 percent of youth arrested for running 
away;89 prostitution was the only other crime for which girls made up the majority of 
arrests.90  Moreover, arrest statistics undercount the incidence of running away 
because statistics on runaways may not include girls arrested or brought into custody 
for absconding, violations of probation, or for warrants, yet these girls are often also 
running away.  Nationally, juvenile justice systems struggle to craft gender-responsive 
strategies to deal with runaway girls.  Tough sanctions for runaway girls reflect 
fear that they will become victims, awareness of the connection between running 
away and commercial sexual exploitation,91 and frustration when girls disobey court-
mandated rules.  While fears about the safety of runaway girls are legitimate, locked 
  
arrests for prostitution and commercialized vice.  CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NCJ 228479, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2008, at 3 (2009), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf. 
87. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 17, at 1139. 
88. See Homeless and Runaway Youth, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues- 
research/human-services/homeless-and-runaway-youth.aspx (last updated Apr. 2010). 
89. CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & BENJAMIN ADAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NCJ 236477, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2009, at 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236477.pdf. 
90. Id.  In 2009, girls accounted for 78 percent of arrests for prostitution or commercialized vice.  Id. 
91. That connection has led the Dallas Police Department to form a “High Risk Victims Unit,” which 
identifies high-risk girls and targets them for intervention as likely victims of commercial sexual 
exploitation.  See Sgt. Byron Fassett, SECOND ANNUAL COLLABORATIVE TO COMBAT HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING, http://uniteandcollaborate.com/sgt.-byron-fassett.html (last visited July 9, 2012); 
see also infra notes 130–171 and accompanying text. 
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detention and incarceration are not a remedy, and the possibility of detention can 
serve as a disincentive to girls who may otherwise want to return home.92 
The mechanics of the juvenile justice process—use of warrants, charging of 
technical violations of probation, VCO provisions,93 and policies preventing runaway 
girls from returning to their foster homes94 make it easy to sanction runaway girls 
with detention and even commitment.  In their 1990 study of contempt sanctions 
among status offenders in Florida, Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier confirmed 
this gender bias in sanctions.  Their study sought to determine whether unequal 
treatment of male and female status offenders and delinquents persisted after JJDP 
Act reforms.  They studied the records of three years of status and nonstatus offense 
referrals in Florida at several stages of the juvenile justice process from intake through 
disposition.95  They found that male status offenders had a 37.6 percent chance of 
formal court referral that increased to 45.7 percent if found in contempt, while 
female status offenders had an initial 31.2 percent chance of formal referral, which 
increased to 69.7 percent for contempt.96  For repeat status offenders facing possible 
incarceration, the bias was even more glaring—male repeat status offenders had a 
3.9 percent chance of incarceration that increased to 4.4 percent with contempt, 
while female repeat status offenders had a 1.8 percent chance of incarceration, which 
increased to 63.2 percent if found in contempt.97 
Girls recognize that running away is a behavior that pushes them deeper into 
the justice system and makes it difficult for many girls to move beyond formal 
probation supervision prior to reaching the age of majority.  Sadly, these escalating 
sanctions for running away miss the reasons girls run, and consequently, miss 
opportunities to work with girls and their families to resolve these underlying issues.  
A more developmentally informed juvenile justice system would focus on identifying 
those reasons and ways to address them, rather than focusing on accountability for 
each run. 
Like running away, trauma is related to girls’ development and triggers their 
juvenile justice involvement.  Trauma, prevalent among girls in the justice system, 
explains and influences girls’ behaviors and drives girls into the system through 
  
92. I, like other attorneys, have represented girls caught in this catch-22: They run away from state cus-
tody and find life on the run boring and scary.  Although they want to return to their communities 
to attend school and be near their families, they do not because they know they will initially be 
locked in detention and they fear that once in detention they will have difficulty getting released.  
93. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
94. See infra notes 104–106 and accompanying text. 
95. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 7, at 1168. 
96. Id. at 1181. 
97. Id. at 1183. 
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structural mechanisms that are contrary to sound developmental principles.  The 
Survey of Youth in Residential Placement found that 42 percent of girls and 22 
percent of boys in custody reported past physical abuse while 35 percent of girls and 
8 percent of boys reported past sexual abuse.98  For many working in the justice 
system, this seems to be a significant undercount of girls who have experienced past 
abuse.  Girls in the justice system are more likely than boys to have experienced 
sexual assault, rape, or sexual harassment, and early sexual abuse is common among 
girls victimized by commercial sexual exploitation.99  Studies show that a history 
of abuse is a more powerful predictor of delinquent behavior for girls than it is 
for boys.100  Girls who have experienced childhood trauma may suffer from post-
traumatic stress disorder and other mental health disorders such as anxiety or 
depression, and studies show that up to 81 percent of girls in the juvenile justice 
system suffer from one or more mental health disorders compared with up to 68.5 
percent of boys.101 
A trauma history is not only a background factor for girls in the juvenile 
justice system, but it can actually drive girls into the system.102  As a result of their 
trauma histories, girls in juvenile justice systems are typically known to the child 
protection, family services, or mental health system long before they are involved 
  
98. ANDREA J. SEDLAK & KARLA S. MCPHERSON, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, NCJ 236477, YOUTH’S NEEDS AND SERVICES: FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF 
YOUTH IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 6, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227728.pdf. 
99. See ZAHN ET AL., supra note 45, at 12; MARGARET A. ZAHN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NCJ 223434, THE GIRLS STUDY GROUP—CHARTING 
THE WAY TO DELINQUENCY PREVENTION FOR GIRLS 4 (2008), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/ojjdp/223434.pdf. 
100. Elizabeth Cauffman, Understanding the Female Offender, JUV. JUST., Fall 2008, at 119, 129–30 (2008). 
101. Paula Braverman & Robert Morris, The Health of Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, in JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 44; see JENNIE L. SHUFELT & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH & JUVENILE JUSTICE, RESEARCH AND PROGRAM BRIEF: YOUTH 
WITH MENTAL HEALTH DISORDERS IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: RESULTS FROM 
THE MULTI-STATE PREVALENCE STUDY (2006), available at http://www.ncmhjj.com/pdfs/ 
publications/PrevalenceRPB.pdf; Meda Chesney-Lind & Scott K. Okamoto, Gender Matters: 
Patterns in Girls’ Delinquency and Gender Responsive Programming, 1 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC., 
no. 3, 2001, at 1; Cindy S. Lederman et al., Characteristics of Adolescent Females in Juvenile 
Detention, 27 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 321, 327 (2004) (finding 78 percent experience mental 
health issues); Linda A. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133, 1136 tbl.2 (2002) (finding 73.8 percent of females suffered from a diagnosed 
mental disorder); Gail A. Wasserman et al., Gender Differences in Psychiatric Disorders at Juvenile 
Probation Intake, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 131, 133 tbl.2 (2005) (finding that 49.5 percent of surveyed 
females in the juvenile justice system suffer from a disorder). 
102. See, e.g., FRANCINE T. SHERMAN, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION 
REFORM: DETENTION REFORM AND GIRLS 21–22 (2005); Chesney-Lind & Okamoto, supra 
note 101. 
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in delinquency.103  Girls in foster placement are more likely to enter the 
detention system than nonfoster girls as a result of histories of multiple foster home 
placements,104 child protection system policies that penalize girls for running 
away,105 and inadequate communication across the juvenile justice and child protec-
tion systems.  All these things contribute to a fragmented personal history and the 
trauma that stems from consistent disruption.106  Moreover, the practice of charging 
girls with minor delinquency when they are viewed as too difficult to handle in 
the child protection system is longstanding.107  Given all of this, many girls in the 
delinquency system are essentially formed by the child protection system. 
Two of the biggest factors currently driving girls into detention and 
incarceration—domestic violence and commercial sexual exploitation—are closely 
linked to trauma and need to be understood and legally framed with an eye to 
child development.  The failure to approach these issues with a developmental frame 
has resulted in many girls being driven into the justice system to their detriment.  
Placing girls who are victims of domestic violence and commercial sexual exploi-
tation in secure detention and incarceration is a modern example of the gender bias 
that has animated the juvenile justice system since its beginning. 
B. Domestic Violence 
From 1996 to 2005, girls’ arrests for assault increased more or decreased less 
than boys’ arrests.  Girls’ arrests for simple assault increased 24 percent as compared 
with a 4.1 percent decrease in simple assault arrests for boys, and girls’ arrests for 
aggravated assault declined 5.4 percent as compared with a 23.4 percent decline 
for boys.108  This data, and the perception of girls’ increased violence that surrounded 
it, fuelled a media cry that girls were becoming more violent and prompted researchers 
to examine the sources of girls’ assault arrests.109 
  
103. See, e.g., Sherman & Greenstone, supra note 51. 
104. SHERMAN, supra note 102, at 19 (citing DYLAN CONGER & TIMOTHY ROSS, VERA INST. OF 
JUSTICE, REDUCING THE FOSTER CARE BIAS IN JUVENILE DETENTION DECISIONS: THE 
IMPACT OF PROJECT CONFIRM (2001)). 
105. See Dylan Conger & Tim Ross, Project Confirm: An Outcome Evaluation of a Program for Children in 
the Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Systems, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 97, 109 (2006); 
Timothy Ross & Dylan Conger, Bridging Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Preventing Unnecessary 
Detention of Foster Children, 81 CHILD WELFARE 471, 493 (2002). 
106. See supra note 105. 
107. MEDA CHESNEY-LIND & LISA PASKO, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN, AND CRIME 
12 (2d ed. 2004). 
108. ZAHN ET AL., supra note 45, at 4. 
109. Id. at 2; Darrell Steffensmeier et al., An Assessment of Recent Trends in Girls’ Violence Using Diverse 
Longitudinal Sources: Is the Gender Gap Closing?, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 355, 356 (2005). 
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Researchers explained the rise in girls’ assault arrests in part as a result of changed 
laws and law enforcement practices concerning domestic violence.  Researchers 
concluded that the rise in girls’ arrests for assaults did not signify a rise in girls’ vio-
lent behavior, but was in part the result of mandatory arrest policies for domestic 
violence that result in police charging girls for home-based violence that might 
have previously been handled in the child protection system.110  Girls who fight 
are more likely than boys to do so at home,111 and are therefore often swept up by 
these mandatory arrest policies.  Girls and young women make up 35 percent of 
juveniles who commit domestic assault;112 and 60 percent of juvenile female 
domestic assault offenders committed their violence against a parent, as compared 
with 46 percent of juvenile male domestic assault offenders.113  Arrests of girls for 
domestic assaults are particularly likely when there are other children in the home, 
making police reluctant to charge and remove an adult caretaker.114 
As a result of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act’s (VAWA)115 initial 
support of mandatory arrest policies,116 many states have mandatory arrest laws or 
policies for domestic violence cases,117 and their impact—increasing arrests of 
  
110. ZAHN ET AL., supra note 45, at 6–7. 
111. After same-sex peers, family members are the second most common victim of girls’ violence.  Id. at 11. 
112. HOWARD N. SNYDER & CARL MCCURLEY, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, NCJ 219180, DOMESTIC ASSAULTS BY JUVENILE OFFENDERS 1 (2008), available 
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/219180.pdf. 
113. Id. at 5. 
114. Francine T. Sherman, Reframing the Response: Girls in the Juvenile Justice System and Domestic Violence, 
JUV. & FAMILY JUST. TODAY, Winter 2009, at 16, 19; Barry C. Feld, Violent Girls or Relabeled 
Status Offenders? An Alternative Interpretation of the Data, 55 CRIME & DELINQ. 241 (2009). 
115. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994). 
116. The Act provided:  
The Attorney General may make grants to eligible States, Indian tribal governments, 
or units of local government for the following purposes: 
(1) To implement mandatory arrest or proarrest programs and policies in police 
departments, including mandatory arrest programs and policies for protection order 
violations.   
Violence Against Women Act § 40231, 108 Stat. at 1932 (emphasis added).  Although under the 
1994 VAWA the federal government granted money to states for both mandatory and proarrest 
policies, in the 2004 reauthorization, the term “mandatory” was completely taken out.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3796hh(b) (2006) (“(1) To implement proarrest programs and policies in police departments, 
including policies for protection order violations.”). 
117. States with mandatory arrests laws or policies include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and the District of 
Columbia.  STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENV’TS, SPECIAL REPORT: ARREST POLICIES FOR 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2 (2010); see David Hirschel et al., Explaining the Prevalence, Context, 
and Consequences of Dual Arrest in Intimate Partner Cases (Apr. 2007) (unpublished report), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218355.pdf. 
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girls for family-based violence—is an unintended consequence.118  The 2005 reau-
thorization of VAWA119 replaced support of mandatory arrest policies with support 
of proarrest policies,120 and a number of states have also adopted proarrest policies, 
in which arrest is the preferred, but not required, response.121  
Domestic violence drives girls into the juvenile justice system beyond just the 
role it plays in arrest.  In addition to mandatory arrest and charging policies, some 
state laws and state or county detention policies require secure detention for individ-
uals charged with domestic assault or battery.122  Like arrest and charging policies, 
these laws were designed to diffuse typical domestic violence situations by removing 
the batterer from the home.  Because girls are disproportionately arrested in cases 
of family violence,123 these statutes result in their disproportionate detention.  
This was the case in Nevada, for example, where counties examining detention data 
found that while girls constituted around 20 percent of the overall detention 
population, they were approximately 40 percent of youth detained for domestic 
battery.124  The recognition that mandatory detention laws—which distracted 
counties from providing family services to keep girls at home—disproportionately 
affected girls resulted in changes in the Nevada law in 2007 removing mandatory 
detention for juveniles.125 
For girls, fighting within their homes can be a way of gaining some control in 
their households and may be a reaction to family chaos or physical and sexual abuse.  
Not surprisingly, prior victimization in the home is common among girls who 
  
118. See Edwards, supra note 48, at 227, 238 (discussing the impact of the criminalization of domestic 
violence on girls whose offenses are often home based). 
119. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-162, 109 Stat. 2960. 
120. For the 2005 VAWA reauthorization, the “Grants to Encourage Arrests” provision was amended 
as such: 
(B) in paragraph (1), by— 
(i) striking “mandatory arrest . . . ”; and 
(ii) striking “mandatory arrest programs . . . ” 
Id.  The current provision reads:  
(b) . . . The Attorney General may make grants to eligible States, Indian tribal 
governments State, tribal, territorial, and local courts (including juvenile courts),, [sic] 
or units of local government for the following purposes: 
(1) To implement proarrest programs and policies in police departments, includ-
ing policies for protection order violations. 
42 U.S.C. § 3796hh. 
121. States with proarrest policies include: Arkansas, California, Florida, Massachusetts, Montana, North 
Dakota, and Tennessee.  Hirschel et al., supra note 117, at 2. 
122. STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENV’TS, supra note 117, at 2. 
123. Supra notes 109–110 and accompanying text. 
124. Sherman, supra note 114, at 19. 
125. Id. at 19–20. 
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behave violently.126  Consistent with Roper’s developmental findings, these histories 
of in-home victimization help explain girls’ in-home violence and, because they are 
victims, reduce their culpability.  This reduced culpability in turn argues against 
arrest, detention, and other involvement in the juvenile justice system that carries 
damaging short- and long-term consequences.127 
The arrest, detention, and juvenile justice processing of a disproportionate 
number of girls for home-based violence is a systemic problem present in many 
states that requires a systemic solution.  A developmentally informed approach 
calls for redefining domestic battery and assault statutorily to exclude cases of 
intrafamily violence by minors, eliminating mandatory arrest and detention 
provisions for domestic violence by minors, or creating a presumption that home-
based violence by minors be handled first through the family services system 
before a youth is charged.  On the program side, it calls for better partnerships 
between juvenile justice systems and domestic violence services and networks, 
including trauma-informed approaches and empowerment models of client coun-
seling,128 as well as better triage of juvenile justice cases to identify and divert those 
that are centrally cases of family chaos out of the delinquency system and into 
family services.129  These types of statutory and programmatic approaches would 
eliminate, or severely restrict, the criminal justice response and encourage a devel-
opmentally appropriate response to home-based trauma, rather than one that 
revictimizes girls.   
  
126. See ZAHN ET AL., supra note 45, at 11. 
127. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
128. See, e.g., Heather C. Moore, How Strong Collaboration Between Legal and Social Service Professionals 
Will Improve Outcomes for Trafficking Survivors and the Anti-trafficking Movement, 1 INTERCULTURAL 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 157 (2006). 
129. Pima County, Arizona’s Domestic Violence Alternative Center (DVAC) is an example of this sort of 
triage and diversion effort.  Consistent with national data on the trend to charge girls with domestic 
battery, girls made up 39 percent of youth referred to DVAC from 2007 to 2010.  DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE ALT. CTR., PROGRAM EVALUATION ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 8 (2010), available 
at http://www.jdaihelpdesk.org/altdettoolsevalu/Pima County AZ Domestic Violence Alternative 
Center 2009 Evaluation.pdf (last visited July 9, 2012), cited in SHERMAN, MENDEL & IRVINE, 
supra note 14.  Many referred youth (both girls and boys) had mental health complications, and their 
families had been involved with the child protection system.  Id. at 14.  Youth charged with domestic 
violence and referred to DVAC were less likely to be detained than youth not referred—of youth 
referred for domestic violence, only 10 percent were detained.  Id. at 27.  Rather, DVAC screened 
youth, and, with their families if possible, provided services addressing family violence and sometimes 
provided brief respite care for the youth.  Id. at 22–23. 
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C. Commercial Sexual Exploitation 
There are no definitive data on the number of girls who are commercially 
sexually exploited each year in the United States.  The most cited study of the issue 
drew on data of homeless and runaway youth and estimated that approximately 
300,000 youth each year are “at risk” for commercial sexual exploitation.130  However, 
the number of youth arrested or identified by state systems is much lower.  In 2009, 
girls made up 78 percent of arrests for prostitution and commercialized vice 
nationally, a total of 1092 arrests.131  Much of the incidence data are local and it 
is unclear whether they reflect the true extent of the problem.  Advocates who 
work with prostituted girls say that because so many evade authorities and so much 
of the sex trade occurs indoors, the scope of the problem is hard to pinpoint.  
Moreover, because state and federal databases categorize this behavior differently—
some states arrest girls engaged in prostitution and some consider them to be 
victims—there is no one source to look to for clear data.132 
How to address the problem of prostituted girls, which has been a promi-
nent international issue since the First World Congress Against Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation of Children in 1996,133 is now a focus of U.S. federal and state 
legislative, law enforcement, and programmatic attention.134  Perhaps more than 
  
130. See RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL ALAN WEINER, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
OF CHILDREN IN THE U.S., CANADA, AND MEXICO (2001).  Experts agree that it is very difficult 
to obtain accurate data defining this problem in part because cases of commercial sexual exploitation 
of children (CSEC) might be recorded in criminal justice or in child protection systems, or not at all. 
131. PUZZANCHERA & ADAMS, supra note 89, at 4. 
132. See Francine T. Sherman & Lisa Goldblatt Grace, The System Response to the Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation of Girls, in JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 331, 335.  A coalition in Suffolk 
County, Massachusetts (Boston) identified four hundred cases of sexually exploited and high-risk 
youth between 2005 and March 2011; Connecticut, which has made an effort to track these youth, 
identified eighty-four victims from 2009 to 2012.  There is also a great deal of discussion about how 
widely boys and LGBT youth are affected.  See, e.g., Kristen Hinman, Lost Boys, VILLAGE VOICE 
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.villagevoice.com/2011-11-02/news/lost-boys. 
133. See, e.g., ECPAT INT’L, GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ACTION AGAINST 
COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 
(2006), available at http://www.ecpat.net/A4A_2005/PDF/Americas/Global_Monitoring_Report-
USA.pdf; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/ 
english/law/pdf/crc-sale.pdf.  See generally NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, HALF 
THE SKY (2009) (describing the scope and complexity of sex trafficking internationally and the 
challenges for those assisting victims and eradicating the problem). 
134. See Wendi J. Adelson, Child Prostitute or Victim of Trafficking?, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 96, 98–111 
(2008); Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Crafting a Commonsense Approach to 
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 23–54 (2011); Tamar R. 
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any other current issue affecting girls in the justice system, the commercial sexual 
exploitation of children (CSEC) risks causing overreaction and has the potential 
to sweep girls into the justice system in unhelpful ways.  It requires law and policy 
that address the nuances of this complex social problem and that are firmly grounded 
in a full and developmental understanding of the girls involved. 
Responses to CSEC straddle the child protection and criminal justice 
systems, creating some uncomfortable results.  The Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act (TVPA),135 passed in 2000 and amended in 2003, 2005, and 2008,136 clearly 
identifies minors trafficked for sex as victims and describes protections for them 
consistent with victim status.137  The TVPA notes, for example, that there is no need 
to prove “force, fraud or coercion”138 in establishing trafficking of a minor, and it 
prohibits detention of trafficked youth and adults in “facilities inappropriate to their 
status as crime victims.”139  
While many state laws addressing this issue have been amended over the last 
ten years, the focus of those changes had long been on easing the prosecution of, 
and increasing penalties for, pimps and johns.140  However, in the last five years 
there has been significant movement among states to pass comprehensive safe-
harbor laws.  Although the details of these laws vary, they are designed to acknowledge 
that commercially sexually exploited children are victims and to provide them with an 
escape from exploitation through an alternative to criminal prosecution and 
appropriate services that will not stigmatize or punish them.141  These services may 
  
Birckhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy, and Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1055, 1067–1081, 1105–1114 (2011); Sherman & Grace, supra note 132, at 340–48. 
135. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as 
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7112 (2006)). 
136. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-457, 122 Stat. 5044; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875. 
137. See 22 U.S.C. 7101(a) (“The purposes of this chapter are to combat trafficking in persons, a contem-
porary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children . . . .”); Shelby 
Schwartz, Comment, Harboring Concerns: The Problematic Conceptual Reorientation of Juvenile Prostitution 
Adjudication in New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 235 (2008). 
138. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 14044e. 
139. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(1)(A). 
140. Sherman & Grace, supra note 132, at 343–45. 
141. Id. 
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include specifically trained advocates,142 multidisciplinary treatment planning,143 and 
safe residences with specially trained staff.144 
The victim label, central to the TVPA and state safe-harbor legislation, can also 
be seen as an oversimplification that is neither sufficiently nuanced nor develop-
mentally accurate, and is disempowering to young women in need of empowerment.  
Teenage girls with experience in the sex trade argue for a harm-reduction approach 
that would allow them to care for each other safely and empower them to make 
safe choices.  These girls describe their involvement as a means of survival, and so, 
on some level, a choice they are making.145  They argue that they make a choice to 
engage in prostitution (albeit a choice born of poverty and severely limited options) 
and the victim label robs them of autonomy.146  In support of the position that they 
should have greater responsibility over their own solutions, they express distrust of 
official systems and note institutional violence that they experience from police 
and hospitals, which is particularly directed toward girls of color and those seen as 
gender nonconforming.147   
Although, a harm-reduction approach for juveniles remains outside the current 
mainstream of thought and policy, recent state laws that explicitly adopt the 
conclusion that prostituted girls are victims can actually be punitive in practice.  
Rooted in a victim-based approach to CSEC, New York passed a safe-harbor 
law in 2007148 and similar comprehensive laws are on the books in Illinois,149  
 
  
142. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 21, 39K(a) (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2012). 
143. Id. § 51D. 
144. See, e.g., Safe Harbour for Exploited Children Act, N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 447-a to 447-b 
(McKinney 2010). 
145. The idea that women and girls are reduced to criminal and personally dangerous conduct to survive 
is not new.  See, e.g., BETH E. RICHIE, UNDERSTANDING THE LINKS BETWEEN VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITY (2003), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/199370.pdf; Nekima Levy-Pounds, Beaten by the System 
and Down for the Count: Why Poor Women of Color and Children Don’t Stand A Chance Against U.S. 
Drug-Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 462, 464 (2006). 
146. See Levy-Pounds, supra note 145; see also Hinman, supra note 132. 
147. See JAZEERA IMAN ET AL., YOUNG WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT PROJECT, GIRLS DO WHAT 
THEY HAVE TO DO TO SURVIVE: ILLUMINATING METHODS USED BY GIRLS IN THE SEX 
TRADE AND STREET ECONOMY TO FIGHT BACK AND HEAL 30 (2009). 
148. Safe Harbour for Exploited Children Act, N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 447-a to 447-b; see also 
Schwartz, supra note 137, at 237. 
149. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-14 (West Supp. 2012) (“[A] person under the age of 18 . . . shall 
be immune from prosecution for a prostitution offense under this Section, and shall be subject to 
the temporary protective custody provisions of Sections 2-5 and 2-6 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.”). 
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Connecticut,150 Washington,151 and, most recently, Massachusetts.152  The 
Massachusetts law, which became effective in February 2012, draws on a number 
of these existing laws and illustrates the way in which the tension between a law 
enforcement and child welfare approach can yield developmentally questionable 
results and may lead to more girls entering the juvenile justice system. 
The Massachusetts safe-harbor law provides that a sexually exploited child 
(defined as someone under eighteen who falls under the TVPA definition, or is a 
victim of sexual servitude, or engages in specific acts covered in the criminal laws 
concerning prostitution) can be the subject of a status offense petition, which in 
Massachusetts is called Child in Need of Services (CHINS).153  The law creates a new 
CHINS category, “sexually exploited child.”154  If the youth admits or is found to 
be a sexually exploited child under the CHINS law, or found to be in need of care 
and protection under the existing law for the protection of abused or neglected 
children,155 the court can stay her arraignment under the delinquency or criminal 
law relating to prostitution or, if she has already been arraigned, impose pretrial 
probation.156  The stay continues in effect as long as the girl “substantially complies” 
with services in the child and family services system.157  The law creates a 
presumption that a CHINS or child protection petition will be filed when a youth 
is charged with a prostitution-related crime.158  In addition to these provisions, the 
Massachusetts law creates a civil cause of action for sexually exploited children,159 
  
150. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-82 (West Supp. 2012).  Only a person sixteen years of age or older 
can be found guilty of prostitution under § 53a-82, and in any prosecution of a person sixteen or seventeen 
years of age for an offense under this section, there shall be a presumption that the actor was coerced 
into committing such offense.  Id. § 53a-82(a), (c). 
151. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.070(6) (West Supp. 2012) (providing that a minor’s first offense 
shall be diverted); id. § 13.40.213 (2011) (providing that a prosecutor may divert the offense for juve-
niles alleged to have committed offenses of prostitution or prostitution loitering even if it would not 
be the juvenile’s first offense, as long as the county has a qualifying program for the juvenile); see also Sex 
Crimes Involving Minors Act, ch. 289, 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 2301. 
152. An Act Relative to the Commercial Exploitation of People, 2011 Mass. Acts ch. 178. 
153. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 21, 39K, 39L (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2012). 
154. Id. § 21. 
155. Id. §§ 24–26. 
156. Id. § 39L.  In Massachusetts, seventeen is the age of adult criminal jurisdiction, but the CHINS law has 
jurisdiction over youth until age eighteen.  Id. ch. 218, § 60; id. ch. 119, § 52.  So a seventeen-year-
old might be charged with prostitution as an adult and then have the criminal case stayed if the youth 
admits under the CHINS law in the Juvenile Court to being sexually exploited.  If the youth is under 
seventeen, the juvenile court will have jurisdiction of both the delinquency and the CHINS petition. 
157. Id. § 39L(c). 
158. Id. § 39L(a). 
159. Id. ch. 260, § 4D.  These provisions of the law toll the statute of limitations while the child is a minor 
or until she is “freed from human trafficking.”  Id. 
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assigns the children advocates with expertise in the issue,160 and creates a multidis-
ciplinary team to develop a plan of services.161  
When told about this law, a young woman survivor of commercial sexual 
exploitation aptly noted that while it says that sexually exploited children are victims, 
it then requires them to comply with the agency to be treated as victims.  To her, 
the law seemed coercive and not compassionate.162  Indeed, the Massachusetts law 
does not reflect the reality that children who are commercially sexually exploited 
are not likely to “substantially comply” with state services, since they are trained 
to evade authorities, almost uniformly have histories of running away from 
authorities and home, and have been described as psychological captives of their 
pimps.163  Moreover, as the survivor points out, it sends a decidedly mixed message 
to hold criminal prosecution over a victim’s head while telling her you view her 
as exploited. 
Expanding the status offender system to include an additional class of girls is 
also a concern given that system’s history as a way to control girls’ behavior and pull 
them into the delinquency system.164  Very few minors are currently charged with 
prostitution-related crimes in Massachusetts, and it would be counterproductive if 
the promise of CHINS services prompted an increase in prostitution-related charges, 
even if those charges were initially stayed.  Moreover, requiring a girl to stipulate 
that she is sexually exploited under the CHINS law in order to stay her delinquency 
case is stigmatizing and contrary to the psychology of exploitation, and many girls may 
understandably choose not to proceed under the new law.165 
  
160. Id. ch. 119, §§ 21, 39K(a). 
161. Id. § 51D. 
162. Interview With C. (Dec. 29, 2011). 
163. See generally JODY RAPHAEL, LISTENING TO OLIVIA: VIOLENCE, POVERTY, AND PROSTITUTION 
(2004); Lisa Goldblatt Grace, Understanding the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, LINK: 
CONNECTING JUV. JUST. & CHILD WELFARE, Fall 2008/Winter 2009, at 1; Kendra Nixon et al., 
The Everyday Occurrence: Violence in the Lives of Girls Exploited Through Prostitution, 8 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 1016 (2002); Sherman & Grace, supra note 132, at 334–40, citing R. BARRI 
FLOWERS, RUNAWAY KIDS AND TEENAGE PROSTITUTION: AMERICA’S LOST, ABANDONED, 
AND SEXUALLY EXPLOITED CHILDREN (2001). 
164. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
165. In Massachusetts and most other states, competent youth direct their legal representation just as adults 
do.  Thus each girl has the right, with the assistance of counsel, to choose to proceed under the new 
law or to allow the delinquency case (or in the case of a seventeen-year old, the criminal case) to 
proceed on its usual course.  See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2011), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/RPC.pdf (Client With Diminished Capacity); COMM. FOR PUB. 
COUNSEL SERVS., PERFORMANCE STANDARDS GOVERNING REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT 
JUVENILES IN DELINQUENCY, YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, AND CRIMINAL CASES (n.d.), available 
at http://www.youthadvocacydepartment.org/jdn/resourcedocs/performance-standards.pdf (last visited 
July 9, 2012). 
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A striking illustration of developmentally inappropriate and inconsistent law 
related to commercial sexual exploitation of minors is that, with few exceptions, 
state criminal laws allow minors to be charged with prostitution-related offenses 
even though they are too young to consent to sex under statutory rape laws.166  For 
example, in New York, the state Superior Court upheld the prosecution for pros-
titution of a twelve-year-old minor who was below the age of consent under the 
state statutory rape law.167  The court reasoned simply that the age of consent for 
rape was irrelevant to prosecution under the New York prostitution law, which 
contained no age requirement.168  However, when presented with the same issue, 
the Texas Supreme Court reached the opposite result, finding it “difficult to 
reconcile the legislature’s recognition of the special vulnerability of children, and 
its passage of laws for their protection, with an intent to find that children under 
fourteen understand the nature and consequences of their conduct when they agree 
to commit a sex act for money.”169 
How can the law concerning commercial sexual exploitation of children 
recognize the reality of child development that increasingly guides the juvenile 
justice system?  States should decriminalize prostitution for minors.  Courts and 
scholars should craft a developmentally appropriate and consistent understanding 
of minors’ ability to consent to sex in the range of real-life contexts in which this 
issue arises.170  Understanding the brutal nature of commercial sexual exploitation and 
the need to protect victimized youth, policymakers must still be mindful of the 
way the impulse to protect teenage girls has historically driven them into the justice 
system.  Finally, the lawyers representing girls who are commercially sexually 
  
166. Michigan, Illinois, Connecticut, and Tennessee revised their laws to decriminalize prostitution for 
some minors.  In Michigan, it was minors under 16 years old.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.448, 
750.449 (West 2004).  In Illinois, it was minors under 18 years old.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/11-14 (West Supp. 2012).  In Connecticut, it was minors under 16 years old.  CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 53a-82 (West Supp. 2012).  In Tennessee it was minors under 18 years old.  TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-513 (2010 & Supp. 2012).  In Texas, the state’s highest court ruled that the 
statute criminalizing prostitution, which required that the crime be committed knowingly in order to be 
punishable, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(a)(1) (West 2011), could not apply to minors under 
fourteen because they cannot consent to sex.  In re B.W., 313 S.W.2d 818, 821–22 (Tex. 2010). 
167. In re Nicolette R., 779 N.Y.S.2d 487 (2004). 
168. Id. at 488. 
169. In re B.W., 313 S.W.2d at 821–22. 
170. See Birckhead, supra note 134, at 1094–1101.  Consideration of sex offenses and the range of ways in 
which teenage sexuality is criminalized is beyond the scope of this Article, but such consideration 
should be a part of developmentally centered thinking about the application of these laws to youth 
and the collateral consequence of them (such as sex offender registries).  See generally FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING 
117–42 (2004). 
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exploited and the programs assisting these young women should draw on develop-
mentally informed approaches, such as empowerment models of client counseling 
and trauma-informed approaches to treatment and systems.171  Just as with running 
away, trauma driven behaviors, and home-based violence, a developmental 
understanding of CSEC should drive policy. 
III. USING DATA IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
The U.S. juvenile justice system was intended as an individualized and caring 
alternative to the adult criminal justice system.  Juvenile justice, as originally 
conceived, was not offense-based but offender-based, with dispositions (and at times 
process) tailored to the needs of the individual youth before the court.172 
This vision of individualized justice, designed to meet the needs and aid in 
the reformation of each youth before the court, relies on discretion at every stage.  
By definition, this is not a one-size-fits-all system, and so discretion is built into 
every decision—arrest, charging, detention, probation, and disposition.  But the 
exercise of discretion makes room for bias, both in the form of the overt exercise of 
prejudice and, more commonly, in the well-intentioned differentiation among 
youth by factors that appear neutral but have a discriminatory impact.173  In juvenile 
justice, it is sometimes challenging to tease apart underlying prejudice from policies 
that appear neutral but are biased in practice. 
For the most part, gender bias that drives girls into the juvenile justice 
system is not obvious in facially discriminatory statutes or policies and may not be 
the result of intentional discrimination by juvenile justice systems.  It is the result 
of the application of facially neutral laws and policies in a way that has a negative 
and biased impact on girls who suffer cumulative disadvantage—what has been 
called “unconscious” or “implicit” discrimination.174  Because gender discrimina-
tion in juvenile justice is found largely in the impact or effect of policies and 
practices, legal challenges are particularly difficult making the movement toward 
data-driven decisions and policies particularly compelling.175 
  
171. See Moore, supra note 128, at 168 n.42, 170 n.51. 
172. See Feld, supra note 5, at 824–25. 
173. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: Findings 
of A Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392, 409 (1996); see also Barry C. Feld, 
The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race and the “Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 327, 377 (1999). 
174. For a very thoughtful critique of the difficulty of establishing structural race bias in juvenile justice and the 
resulting importance of the disproportionate minority contact (DMC) core requirement to address race 
bias in juvenile justice, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (2007). 
175. See id. 
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In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis176 that to estab-
lish state discrimination in the race context, plaintiffs must show intent to discrim-
inate.177  In later cases the Court clarified Washington, holding that showing 
discriminatory effect was not sufficient to prove that intent must have been present.  
Rather, the plaintiff must show that the state decided on its course of conduct 
“because of” its effects on the particular protected group.178  The line of cases 
stemming from Washington v. Davis has made successful equal protection chal-
lenges to the sort of race and gender discrimination that results from systemwide 
juvenile justice policies and practices very difficult.179  Equal protection challenges 
based on gender discrimination are even more difficult than those based on race 
because unlike race, which is a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny, classi-
fications based on gender generally require only intermediate scrutiny for states to 
establish legitimate justifications for their discriminatory practice or policy.180 
Title IX, which prohibits educational institutions that receive federal funds 
from practicing gender discrimination,181 may also have limited utility as a basis for 
addressing gender-based discrimination as it appears in juvenile justice systems.  
First, Title IX challenges would be limited to discrimination in educational or 
vocational programs in the juvenile justice system.182  Next, while Title IX applies 
in the women’s prison context, it has had limited success because courts have 
generally deferred to prison officials.183  Finally, the standard for Title IX liability 
in the juvenile justice context is not clear, and courts have differed on the extent 
  
176. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
177. Id.; see Johnson, supra note 174, at 386–87. 
178. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see also Johnson, supra note 174, at 
386–87. 
179. Johnson, supra note 174, at 387–88. 
180. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); see Marsha L. Levick & Francine T. Sherman, When 
Individual Differences Demand Equal Treatment: An Equal Rights Approach to the Special Needs of 
Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 25–26 (2003); Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
A Postscript on VMI, 6 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 59 (1997); Ann K. Wooster, Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clause Challenges Based on Sex Discrimination—Supreme Court Cases, 178 A.L.R. FED. 25 (2002). 
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).  See generally David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 217 (2005) (discussing the scope of Title IX, including its application in the prison 
context and to what extent its analysis parallels equal protection analysis). 
182. See Cohen, supra note 181, at 228-233.  
183. See, e.g., Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 614 (8th Cir. 1997); Women Prisoners of the D.C. 
Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  In the juvenile 
context, see Lothes v. Butler Cnty. Juvenile Rehab. Ctr., 243 F. App’x 950 (6th Cir. 2007).  But see, 
e.g., Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1231 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that an award of merit pay to 
men, but not to women, for participating in the same vocational training course in the same location 
amounted to disparate treatment violating Title IX); Cohen, supra note 181, at 228–31; Levick & 
Sherman, supra note 180, at 28–29. 
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to which Title IX analysis mirrors equal protection analysis for gender.184  As with 
equal protection analysis, proof of discriminatory intent, or even proof of discrimi-
natory impact, without a legitimate state justification is difficult given the uncon-
scious gender discrimination found in juvenile justice systems, the limitations on local 
data collection, and the discretion built into so much of juvenile justice decisionmaking.  
A particular problem establishing the impact of any one juvenile justice decision is 
that so many juvenile justice decisions are multifactored, making it difficult to 
connect an outcome to one discriminatory factor.185 
Equal protection and state Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) challenges to 
gender discrimination in juvenile justice have not been very successful.186  Challenges 
to transfer or disposition decisions alleging that a lack of parity between girls’ and 
boys’ programming resulted in discrimination have been rejected on the theory that 
girls and boys in the juvenile justice system are not similarly situated.  That both 
parties be similarly situated is an essential element of equal protection analysis.187 
Finally, even in the unlikely event that unconstitutional gender discrimination 
could be established against practices of a juvenile justice system, courts’ increasing 
use of qualified immunity in system reform cases presents an additional barrier.  
Qualified immunity, which prevents recovery against a state actor for a constitu-
tional violation unless the violation was clearly established as unconstitutional at 
the time of the violation and the state actor knew or should have known that it was 
unconstitutional, increasingly prevents remedies in cases involving youth.188 
Given the history of hidden or unconscious gender discrimination, programs 
and policies designed for boys but used with girls, and the absence of effective 
  
184. See Cohen, supra note 181, at 228–31. 
185. Id.  Detention and disposition standards are examples of multifactored juvenile justice decisions.  
Once a youth is found delinquent, the disposition assigned often results from the court’s judgment 
concerning what will provide needed treatment or rehabilitation, or address “present and long term 
public safety.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2012).  Statutes 
guiding these decisions provide courts with little guidance about how to exercise their discretion, 
but typically a totality of factors will be considered, such as the nature of the offense, the child’s social 
history, and the availability of family support.  See Feld, supra note 5, at 847–50; Moriearty, supra 
note 5, at 307–08. 
186. See Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in 
Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201 (2005); Stefanie Fleischer 
Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on Behalf of Women Offenders, 5 COLUM J. GENDER & L. 1, 7–14 
(1995); Levick & Sherman, supra note 180, at 35–42. 
187. See, e.g., State v. Spina, 982 P.2d 421 (Mont. 1999); Benson v. State, 763 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000).  
188. See, e.g., Safford v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009); Barry C. Feld, T.L.O And Reddings Unanswered 
(Misanswered) Fourth Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 
953 (2011). 
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ways to remedy this discrimination in the courts, the move toward data-driven 
decisionmaking in juvenile justice is important for girls.  In the last fifteen to twenty 
years, juvenile justice systems have increased their capacities to measure what they 
do, and with that there is increasing pressure to be reflective and set policy based on 
those data.189  Although there is a broad range across the country in systems’ data 
capacities and utilization, the trend is clear. 
Data is increasingly being used both to examine juvenile justice practices and 
to evaluate programs.190  Some systems now have the capacity, for example, to make 
detention decisions based on an objective assessment of a youth’s risk and then to 
analyze those decisions over time to determine whether they are being made objec-
tively based on criteria thought to be gender neutral.  They can then determine 
whether those criteria are gender neutral in practice or whether they are having a 
discriminatory impact.  If decisions are having a discriminatory impact in practice, 
some jurisdictions now have the capacity to pinpoint where bias is occurring in 
the system.  Having those data gives systems, if they are open to using it, the power 
to be fairer and more targeted in their practices.  Pushed forward by a federal 
agenda to support evidence-based practices, some effort at program evaluation, 
which was almost unheard of in juvenile justice twenty years ago, is now increas-
ingly common and almost essential to obtain funding.  
However, unlike the use of data to measure and devise remedies for dispropor-
tionate minority contact, which has been the subject of considerable methodolog-
ical attention,191 the use of data to measure gender disparities is not widespread or 
consistent.  The use of data to assess and remedy gender disparities suffers 
because (1) few systems are examining their practices to determine whether they 
have a gender-based discriminatory impact; (2) the field has not advanced to the 
point of determining exactly how to measure discriminatory impact on girls; and 
  
189. See LaWanda Johnson, Creating Juvenile Justice: Models for Change, 93 JUDICATURE 22, 23 (2009); 
Stan Schneider & Lola Simpson, Getting on Board With Juvenile Justice Information Technologies, 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 456, 459–64. 
190. Schneider & Simpson, supra note 189, at 464–75. 
191. Here again, the elevation of DMC to a core requirement resulted in federal guidance on the meth-
odology to best assess DMC.  Prior to 2002, when the focus was on confinement, DMC was usually 
measured using the Disproportionate Representation Index (DRI), which compared the percentage 
of youth of color at a specific decision point with the percentage of youth of color in the general 
population.  Following 2002, the Relative Rate Index (RRI) became more common, and is consi-
dered to be the more accurate measure.  The RRI compares the rate of youth of color in the system 
at a particular decision point with the rate of white youth at that decision point and does not consider 
this in relation to the number of youth of color in the general population.  The RRI focuses attention 
on bias at each decision point.  See James Bell & Raquel Mariscal, Race, Ethnicity, and Ancestry in 
Juvenile Justice, in JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 111. 
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(3) data-driven approaches rarely consider the structural gender inequality that is 
embedded in society and reinforced by many juvenile justice practices. 
The following Subparts will consider three ways in which those in the juvenile 
justice system use data and how that use of data affects girls.  
A. Intersectionality in Juvenile Justice 
The use of data to understand and address discrimination in juvenile justice 
is furthest along in the area of racial disparities.192  In 1992, the JJDP Act required 
states to examine DMC as a core requirement of federal funding.193  Prior to 
1992, DMC was not a core requirement and was conceptualized more narrowly 
as disproportionate minority confinement.  The expansion of the definition of race 
disparities from confinement to contact reflected the developing understanding, 
through data, that race bias occurs at each stage of the juvenile justice process—
case processing, detention, adjudication, probation, disposition, and waiver to the 
adult system.194  Moreover, studies show that these discretionary decisions reflect 
underlying prejudice among many decisionmakers.  Qualitative studies of probation 
files found that, controlling for offense and offense histories, probation officers were 
more likely to attribute failures of white youth to some fault in their circumstances, 
while they were more likely to attribute failures of black youth to some fault of 
their character.195 
Like youth of color, girls in the justice system have also experienced bias 
resulting from the unaccountable exercise of discretion by decisionmakers 
throughout the juvenile justice process.196  For girls, differential treatment has 
resulted in their arrest, charging, detention, probation, and even secure dispositions 
  
192. See infra note 193–195 and accompanying text; supra note 191. 
193. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (2006). 
194. See Bell & Mariscal, supra note 191, at 114–15; Bishop & Frazier, supra note 7, at 1180–82, 1184. 
195. See George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: 
Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 567 (1998); Sara Steen et 
al., Explaining Assessments of Future Risk: Race and Attributions of Juvenile Offenders in Presentencing 
Reports, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN 254 (Darnel F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-
Leonard eds., 2005).  There is a debate in the literature about how intentional the practices that result in 
disproportionate minority contact are.  Some say that they reflect an intentional effort to subjugate 
minorities and as such are the most recent iteration of institutional racism.  See MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
(2010); JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, ADORATION OF THE QUESTION: REFLECTIONS 
ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 3–7 (2008). 
196. Gender bias in the juvenile justice system is well documented.  See, e.g., CHESNEY-LIND & PASKO, 
supra note 107, at 55–93. 
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for status offenses, misdemeanors, and technical violations of probation and 
parole.197  Every day, girls are securely detained for offenses that would not result 
in detention for a boy.198  This overuse of secure confinement has been attributed 
to (1) paternalism among decisionmakers who try to protect girls from harm; (2) 
an effort to use the justice system to obtain services for high-need girls; (3) an effort 
to protect girls from sexual victimization; (4) fear of teen pregnancy and its social 
costs; (5) fear of girls’ expressions of sexuality; and (6) intolerance of girls who are 
not readily cooperative and compliant.199 
Systemic discretion, with its opportunity for bias, has hit girls of color partic-
ularly hard, and black girls have been the swiftest growing group of girls referred to 
the juvenile courts and entering detention.200  In 1992, black girls made up 30 percent 
of girls referred to the juvenile courts, and by 2008, referrals of black girls had 
increased 72 percent from their 1992 level, making up 35 percent of all girls’ 
referrals.  The pattern was even more pronounced in detention.  In 1992, black 
girls made up 35 percent of girls detained—a total of 15,237.  By 2002, the number 
of black girls detained had nearly doubled to 30,009.  By 2008, the number of black 
girls had declined, as it had for girls overall, but it still remained 75 percent higher 
than the 1992 level.201  The proportion of black girls in the juvenile justice system 
is particularly dramatic because they make up only 8 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion of youth aged ten to seventeen.202 
Despite advances in the use of data to measure and address race disparities 
in juvenile justice systems, and despite the rapid growth in the number of black 
girls in the juvenile justice system, the intersection of race and gender in juvenile 
justice is almost never considered.203  Few systems routinely disaggregate their data 
by race and ethnicity and cross-reference them by gender.  More commonly, 
systems examine all girls and all boys and then all youth by race and ethnicity, and 
as a result, they miss the intersection of race and gender entirely.  Even jurisdictions 
collecting data to address DMC rarely disaggregate by gender, and so, although 
we know that black girls are the swiftest growing population of girls in the system, 
  
197. See SHERMAN, supra note 102, at 29–38; SHERMAN, MENDEL & IRVINE, supra note 14 (manuscript 
at 4–10). 
198. See SHERMAN, MENDEL & IRVINE, supra note 14 (manuscript at 4–10). 
199. SHERMAN, supra note 102, at 17–18. 
200. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 17, at 1159–61. 
201. Sickmund et al., supra note 14; see also SHERMAN, MENDEL & IRVINE, supra note 14 (manuscript 
at 7). 
202. Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990–2010, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop (last updated Dec. 16, 2011). 
203. See Nanda, supra note 17.  For a discussion of gender and race intersectionality in adult women, see 
Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 1246. 
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we know little about what drives them into the system and how those drivers 
affect girls of different races and ethnicities.  In this case, the data are available to 
many systems, but the intersection of race and gender is not understood and the 
research questions are not asked. 
A recent study of girls in the justice system confirms disparities at the intersec-
tion of race and gender in six California counties.204  Black girls living in these 
six counties (in the Bay Area, Sacramento Valley, and Southern California) made 
up approximately 3 percent of the population in California, but they made up 
15–60 percent of girls arrested in their respective counties, 24–74 percent of 
girls detained, and up to 67 percent of girls with institutional commitments.205  In 
one Bay Area county, black girls made up 12 percent of the population but 60 
percent of girls’ arrests, 74 percent of juvenile hall detentions, and 72 percent of in-
custody holds.206  Disparities among black girls were greater and more consistent 
than for any other subpopulation of girls.207 
Using data to identify decision points in the juvenile justice system that 
contribute to disparities, working with local decisionmakers to eliminate race as a 
factor in decisions, and making decisions more objective has been an effective strat-
egy to reduce race disparities.208  A byproduct of this work is decisionmakers’ 
improved awareness of the many ways in which their decisions have a race impact.  
In this new data-driven climate, similar strategies should be used by systems focused 
on reducing disparate treatment of black girls and other girls of color in the juvenile 
justice system. 
B. Using Data to Promote Fairness 
Gender bias for girls in juvenile justice systems occurs in small and hidden 
ways every day.  Well-meaning decisionmakers act to protect girls, or act out of 
frustration at girls’ misbehavior, and in doing so push girls deeper into the sys-
tem through mechanisms such as aggressive enforcement of warrants and violations 
of probation.  System policies allow, and in some cases reinforce, these decisions 
  
204. See MONIQUE W. MORRIS, STEPHANIE BUSH-BASKETTE & KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, 
CONFINED IN CALIFORNIA: WOMEN AND GIRLS OF COLOR IN CUSTODY (forthcoming 2012). 
205. Id. (manuscript at 25–28). 
206. Id. (manuscript at 25). 
207. Id. (manuscript at 24). 
208. See ELEANOR HINTON HOYTT ET AL., ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE 
DETENTION REFORM: REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE DETENTION (2001).  
Organizations such as the W. Haywood Burns Institute use this strategy successfully to assist local 
juvenile justice jurisdictions to reduce race disparities.  See Our Work, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., 
http://www.burnsinstitute.org/article.php?id=56 (last visited July 9, 2012). 
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so that girls with minor offenses and technical violations are driven deeper into 
the justice system.209  This occurs routinely, making data analysis of cases over time 
essential for jurisdictions to see the patterns in their actions.210 
For girls, then, the trend toward data-driven decisions is promising when 
data uncover gender bias, prompting systems to change policies and practices to 
be fairer.  While greater availability of data holds promise, its usefulness to girls 
depends on the research questions asked and the ways systems respond.  To benefit 
girls, systems must have data capacity and knowhow, an understanding of how girls 
are cumulatively disadvantaged, and a willingness to change longstanding prac-
tices if they are shown to have a discriminatory impact. 
Washoe County, Nevada’s experience illustrates how data can increase 
understanding and change practices for girls.  As a Juvenile Detention Alternatives 
Initiative (JDAI) jurisdiction, Washoe County closely tracks detention data and 
strives to base policy and practice decisions on that data.211  Since 2006, county 
officials have been closely monitoring data about girls in their system in an effort 
to eliminate the unhelpful secure detention of girls, prevent girls from unneces-
sarily penetrating their juvenile justice system, and improve services to girls in 
the community.212 
This 2006 data revealed that 90 percent of detained girls were confined for 
technical violations of probation and not for new crimes.213  Upon closer analysis, 
it was determined that in 2006, 50 percent of girls were on probation for misde-
meanor offenses and 10 percent were on probation for status offenses.214  These 
girls were placed on probation for offenses that were unlikely to have triggered a 
probation sentence for boys, such as shoplifting, possession of alcohol, possession 
of marijuana, and domestic battery.215  Probation conditions were then imposed, 
  
209. See supra notes 83–119 and accompanying text. 
210. For examples of such data analysis, see SHERMAN, MENDEL & IRVINE, supra note 14 (manuscript 
at 19–46).  
211. The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) is a fifteen-year-old initiative of the Annie 
E. Casey Foundation designed to help jurisdictions reduce the unnecessary detention of youth.  
Now in 110 jurisdictions across the United States, JDAI has been very effective using a data-driven 
approach to increase objectivity in detention decisions.  See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. 
CASEY FOUNDATION, TWO DECADES OF JDAI: FROM DEMONSTRATION PROJECT TO 
NATIONAL STANDARD 2 (2009). 
212. Telephone Interview With Carey Stewart, Dir., Washoe Cnty. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice Servs. (Mar. 
23, 2012).  
213. Washoe Cnty. Dep’t of Juvenile Servs., Washoe County Detention Reform for Girls (2007) 
(unpublished report) (on file with author), cited in SHERMAN, MENDEL & IRVINE, supra note 14 
(manuscript at 50). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
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and when girls failed to comply with those conditions, they were lawfully detained.  
Washoe County’s data were consistent with national data.  In 2006, approximately 
40 percent of detained girls were confined for technical violations or status offenses 
as compared with 25 percent of boys.216   
Without data, Washoe County would not have seen its pattern of impos-
ing probation disproportionately on misdemeanant and status-offending girls, 
resulting in their detentions for technical violations.  Seeing that pattern allowed 
officials to consider the attitudes that result in those sentences and rethink their 
probation practice.  Washoe County administrators decided on the most 
targeted solution: They eliminated probation sentences for status offenders across 
the board and reduced the use of probation as a sentence for misdemeanors.  
Instead, they now address these cases through voluntary services or the child and 
family services system.  Overall, the use of secure detention for girls in Washoe 
County dropped a dramatic 50 percent from 2006 to 2010.217  At the same time, 
system practices have become more intentional and reflective.  Having changed 
the way they manage cases to respond to the needs of girls and families, Washoe 
County has prevented girls from penetrating the formal juvenile justice system.218 
While the failure of systems to examine the intersection of race and gender 
in their data illustrates the unmet potential of data-driven decisionmaking, 
Washoe County’s experience illustrates that potential being met.  In Washoe 
County, data use allowed administrators to identify and reduce the discriminatory 
impact often embedded in juvenile justice practices.  However, as with DMC, 
federal leadership is critical for experiences like this to become the norm.  States 
should be required to collect juvenile justice data by gender and cross-reference it 
by race and ethnicity categories so they can understand the impact of juvenile 
justice decisions on subgroups of girls.  With an ability to identify gender-based 
and race- and gender-based discriminatory impact in a range of juvenile justice 
decisions and practices, local jurisdictions will have the data needed to understand 
how juvenile justice decisions and practices in their jurisdictions support gender bias 
that has been present since the beginning of juvenile justice in the United States. 
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C. Assessing Risk: The Assessment Debate 
Juvenile justice systems’ increasing use of validated, objective assessment instru-
ments to guide important decisions is another instance of the trend favoring data-
driven decisionmaking.  Risk and risk/needs assessment instruments are used to assist 
courts in detention and disposition decisions.  These instruments quantify the risk of 
a youth failing to appear in court (in the case of detention) or of reoffending (in the 
case of both detention and postadjudication instruments).  In addition, the “needs” 
components in the instruments can assist postdisposition planning.219   
In the field, there has been debate around the role of gender in developing 
and implementing these instruments.  Should these instruments be gender neutral 
or gender responsive?  Should they include questions related to what we know to 
be issues prevalent among girls in the juvenile justice system to guide systems 
toward gender-responsive, postadjudication services; or should they strive for gen-
der neutrality, mindful of the risk of widening the net of girls who are under juve-
nile justice supervision because of their needs?  If the assessment is gender neutral 
on its face, is it being administered in a gender neutral way?  If gender is to be consid-
ered, how should it be considered?  Is gender alone predictive of future delin-
quency, or should the instrument focus on factors associated with gender?  If the 
analysis focuses on factors associated with gender, how can it guard against 
sweeping high-need, low-risk girls further into a juvenile justice system that is ill 
equipped to assist them? 
The discussion around gender and risk-assessment instruments illustrates 
the complexities and limitations of the data-driven movement in juvenile justice.  
As with establishing evidence-based practice,220 the relatively low numbers of 
girls in the juvenile justice system and the design of the system around boys have 
slowed the development of assessment instruments for girls.  In its 2010 scan of 
assessment instruments, the Girls Study Group identified thirty-five risk or 
risk/needs assessment instruments and, of those, rated eleven as favorable (having 
positive gender-based performance information), three as unfavorable, and twenty  
 
  
219. See Gina M. Vincent, John Chapman & Nathan E. Cook, Risk–Needs Assessment in Juvenile Justice: 
Predictive Validity of the SAVRY, Racial Differences, and the Contribution of Needs Factors, 38 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 42 (2011).  For a discussion of the reliability of needs factors in predicting 
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220. See infra text accompanying notes 235–248. 
1622 59 UCLA L. REV. 1584 (2012) 
-one as having unknown gender-based performance information.221  A risk/needs 
assessment that includes areas of specific concern for girls, such as sexual 
victimization, runs the real risk of sweeping more girls into the system as a result of 
their needs.   
New York’s experience with its postadjudication risk assessment instrument 
illustrates the difficulty of, and potential backlash to, explicitly considering gender 
in juvenile justice decisionmaking.  New York’s Probation Assessment Tool (PAT) 
was designed in 2003 as a validated instrument to be used by probation officers 
to recommend postadjudication delinquency dispositions to the Family Court.222  
The PAT, designed by the Vera Institute of Justice and the New York Probation 
Department, assesses a youth’s risk of reoffending and on that basis makes a recom-
mendation as to the level of restrictiveness needed in the postadjudication 
disposition.223  The court, bound by statute to “order the least restrictive available 
alternative . . . which is consistent with the needs and best interests of the respondent 
and the need for protection of the community,”224 is not required to follow the 
probation recommendation, but that recommendation and the PAT score tend to 
be given great weight in ordering dispositions.225 
New York’s PAT was part of an effort to increase consistency and rationality 
in probation recommendations through a data-driven, objective approach.  In 
assessing risk of reoffense, the PAT assigns an “asset score” based on the age, gen-
der, charge, arrest history, school attendance, peer group, and substance abuse 
characteristics of the youth, which are all factors associated with future offending.  
The PAT was based on an analysis of 730 adjudicated juvenile delinquents receiv-
ing dispositions in spring 2000 whose arrest patterns were tracked for three 
years.226  Based on that data, New York’s PAT awards fourteen asset points to 
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girls based on their gender, indicating that they are less likely to reoffend than 
similarly situated boys.227 
In In re Geraldine A.,228 a New York Family Court judge criticized the PAT 
for automatically awarding asset points to girls based on gender, finding that the 
PAT “impermissibly discriminates against juvenile males by awarding a preference 
to delinquent females in the form of asset points based solely on the immutable fact 
of their gender.”229  The judge described eight “similarly situated” youth before the 
court for disposition.  In these cases, the fourteen asset points awarded for gender 
resulted in probation recommendations of less restrictive dispositions for the girls 
than the boys.230 
The court further criticized the PAT for removing the discretionary, indi-
vidualized determinations of the needs of each juvenile that are a critical component 
of juvenile court dispositions.  The court went into detail about the outcomes in 
the selected cases to suggest that the less restrictive PAT recommendations were 
incorrect and expressed concern that the Probation Department is, in effect, rewrit-
ing the juvenile statutes through its policy of relying on the PAT.231   
New York’s PAT is noteworthy as a rare risk-assessment instrument using 
gender as a predictor of positive behavior—being a girl reduced the likelihood 
of reoffending.  It is unusual both because it uses gender, rather than factors asso-
ciated with gender, and because it uses gender to predict positive rather than 
negative behavior.  Instruments that consider factors associated with girls generally 
use negative behaviors, such as running away, which increase the likelihood of a 
more restrictive disposition.  Research underlying the PAT supported its positive 
approach, showing that in their first eighteen months in the community following 
disposition, 56 percent of boys were rearrested compared with just 22 percent of 
girls; a more than twofold difference.232 
Gender matters in juvenile justice and, while assigning a significant number of 
asset points to all girls may be too blunt a mechanism, it contrasts with discre-
tionary juvenile justice decisions that often restrict girls more than boys for minor 
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offenses.233  In addition to the court’s finding that the PAT discriminates against 
juvenile males, the judge reasoned that girls are ill served by the inflated PAT 
score, which may result in less services and less supervision than they need.234  
Contrary to this view, the longstanding juvenile justice notion that a nonempirical 
determination of need should form the basis for disposition has not served girls well.  
Given this, objective risk/needs assessments are a positive development for girls. 
D. Evidence-Based Practice and Girls 
In the late 1990s, social work and other social sciences popularized evidence-
based practice (EBP), which originated in the health fields,235 and in the early 2000s 
EBP made its way into juvenile justice.  EBPs are practices or programs that 
have been determined effective through rigorous, scientific methods, and because 
they are rigorously evaluated, they are considered by many to be the best possible 
interventions and services to achieve specific outcomes.236 
In the last ten years, the movement favoring EBP in juvenile justice has 
become firmly rooted, reinforced by federal funding requirements that increas-
ingly favor programs with an evidence base.237  The movement in favor of EBP in 
juvenile justice has professionalized the field and improved outcomes in many 
systems.238  In fact, it is striking that juvenile justice systems have continued for so 
long without the use of EBP or other proof of positive outcomes.239 
However, the EBP movement in human services has been criticized, often 
in ways that are directly relevant to girls and other minority populations in the 
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juvenile justice system.240  First, despite the increasing use of data by juvenile 
justice systems and programs, many programs do not have the capacity to mount 
the level of scientific research needed to establish a program as evidence based, 
leaving effective innovations unable to compete for federal funding and ultimately 
unlikely to continue.  This is particularly problematic for programs serving minority 
populations (including girls) and those located in minority communities, where 
the number of youth in a program might not support the level of evaluation needed 
to establish an evidence-based practice.  Critics argue that promising innovations, 
and particularly those tailored to and effective with minority cultures, are losing 
financial support and disappearing as a result.  This leaves minority communities 
with programming poorly suited to their specific needs. 
Girls exemplify this concern.  As part of an agenda to promote research needed 
to better understand and make local decisions regarding girls in the justice 
system, the Girls Study Group tried to identify “promising programs, program 
elements, and implementation principles.”241  Out of sixty-one programs identified 
as specifically targeting girls’ delinquency, it found that forty-four had not been 
studied.  Of the remaining seventeen that had been studied, the Girls Study Group 
found none had conclusive evidence of effectiveness.242  For example, it faulted 
the research design in eleven of the programs as inadequate to determine whether 
positive outcomes were the result of the program or some other factor.243  The 
GAO investigated the Study Group’s approach to promoting effective girls’ 
programming and found that programs were being held to the high standards 
required for evidence-based practices.  Some of the experts interviewed by the GAO 
believed those standards were unrealistically high and burdensome, resulting in 
positive programs failing to achieve EBP classification.244  Despite much work 
and funding, little guidance had been provided to the field about how to develop and 
measure successful programming for girls, and the standards used to assess success 
may have resulted in successful programs and program elements being overlooked.  
The GAO report prompted OJJDP to provide additional training and technical 
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assistance to the field about program evaluation.  Moreover, in fiscal year 2011, 
OJJDP awarded evaluation grants to promising girls’ programs in an effort to 
further develop the evidence needed to determine what works for girls.245 
A second critique is that evidence-based practice is too rigid a frame to capture 
all that makes juvenile justice programming effective and removes the individ-
ualized quality central to social work and juvenile justice programming.  Critics 
argue that evidence-informed practice, which would combine evidence with craft, 
is a better goal.246  An evidence-informed practice approach would be more flexible 
and more reflective of instincts developed through a range of professional expe-
riences, which, while not easily quantifiable, might be more effective among 
diverse populations. 
Finally, a critique drawn from women’s international development work seems 
most apt.247  Success for girls in the justice system (like women in developing 
countries) requires social change, and the methodology used to identify evidence-
based practices does not measure, or even really consider, social change.  Although 
evaluation for EBP does not preclude other types of research, the emphasis on EBP 
to the exclusion of other ways of thinking about interventions reduces the focus on 
ways to promote and measure social change.248 
As we have seen, the entry of misbehaving and high-need girls with low 
levels of criminality into the juvenile justice system is perhaps the most consistent 
and intransigent problem reformers for girls face.249  This problem has existed 
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since the formation of the U.S. juvenile justice system and continues today.  Over 
time, a range of laws and system practices has perpetuated this overintervention.  
When one practice is removed (for example, through the deinstitutionalization 
of status offender mandate in 1974),250 another surfaces (such as the current prac-
tice of arresting girls disproportionately for home-based violence).251  Data-driven 
approaches, when used intentionally to provide jurisdictions with the insights 
needed to identify and ultimately address systemic bias, will benefit girls and 
create fairer systems.  But ultimately, one must conclude that only real social 
change—changed attitudes and appreciation of girls—will resolve the issue in a 
meaningful and lasting way. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2012, twenty years after the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act instructed states to assess their systems for gender responsiveness, girls continue 
to be detained and committed for offenses that would not result in similarly harsh 
treatment for boys.  The social expectations that girls be obedient, modest, and 
behave cautiously motivate a continuation of structural gender bias as well as com-
bined gender and race bias that has had remarkable longevity.  Arrests for domestic 
battery and prostitution-related offenses now supplement the continued net of 
status offenses and technical probation and parole violations that draw girls into 
the juvenile justice system. 
However, we are at the beginning of a more developmentally centered and 
data-driven age in juvenile justice in which systems have the tools to be more reflec-
tive and intentional in policy and practice.  Improved understanding and court 
recognition of child development’s role in juvenile justice policy, coupled with 
federal recognition of girls’ developmental needs, suggests that a more complete 
understanding of girls’ behavior in their homes and on the streets will guide future 
policy.  The increased use of data in juvenile justice systems is particularly prom-
ising given the hidden nature of so much of the gender-based inequity in justice 
system practices. 
Over time, the juvenile justice pendulum swings from a rehabilitation focus 
to placing more emphasis on punishment, and then back again—progress has 
not been linear.  Each pendulum swing looks a little different, reflecting advances 
in our knowledge and approach to youth.  This has been true of policies for girls in 
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the justice system as well.  Although we appear to be repeating past mistakes by 
sweeping girls into the system when they are victims of domestic violence, the 
system itself is more aware of girls’ needs, the outcry is quicker and more informed, 
and practices are measured against a progressive movement away from secure 
confinement for youth.  In this way, we are making progress, despite the 
understandable frustration of those who have watched the pendulum over time. 
As we once again enter a more hopeful era in juvenile justice, consistent 
federal leadership to reduce structural gender bias is essential for girls to be a full 
part of this positive pendulum swing.  Juvenile justice reformers must utilize the 
tools now available to them to prevent repetition of unconscious gender discrim-
ination and create a fairer and more positive justice for girls. 
 
